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Abstract
Empirical studies have found that takeover activity is positively related to the
absolute size of industry-level shocks. We develop a dynamic framework with com-
peting bidders which explains this pattern. We model both hostile and agreed bids,
determining the timing and terms of takeover in each case, and find that takeover
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1 Introduction
When do takeovers occur? Empirical research, summarized by Andrade, Mitchell and
Stafford (2001), highlights two consistent features of the pattern of takeover activity.
First, takeovers occur in waves, peaking with the business cycle and stock market valua-
tions. Secondly, within a wave, takeover activity clusters strongly by industry; however,
there is negligible correlation between the industries involved in different waves. These
findings suggest that takeover activity is due in large part to industry-level factors, with
takeover representing one form of industry restructuring. Examination of takeover activ-
ity at industry level reveals another pattern: that takeover activity is positively related
to the absolute magnitude of industry shocks. In other words, takeovers occur in in-
dustries experiencing large positive or negative shocks to industry-specific conditions.
Papers providing evidence of this relationship are surveyed below; in summary, these find
a ‘U’-shaped relationship between takeover activity and industry shocks.
In this paper, we develop a theoretical framework to explain this industry-level phe-
nomenon. We show how takeovers do not occur when industry-specific shocks are mod-
erate but only when they are sufficiently large, in either direction. Our results fit the
empirical pattern, explaining both sides of the ‘U’ within a single model. We go on to
consider a number of further questions. How does takeover activity depend on the degree
of uncertainty? Is the market for corporate control efficient, in the sense that the timing
of takeover is appropriate? How do these conclusions depend on the form of takeover, i.e.,
the mechanism by which takeover comes about? When the timing of takeover is beyond
its direct control, what other actions might the target take to influence the timing of
takeover?
We remain broad-minded about the mechanism by which takeover comes about, em-
ploying two distinct models. First we model takeover as a competitive bidding process,
its timing and terms being determined by the potential acquirers in competition with
one another. This situation can be thought of as a hostile takeover, in which the target
firm is essentially passive. Subsequently we present a model of agreed takeover, in which
the target chooses when to open negotiations with one of the acquirers, and the terms of
takeover result from bargaining between the parties. Note that we use the term ‘takeover’
quite generically: this may be a merger combining the resources of the two firms, or an
acquisition of assets where the target’s shareholders cease to be owners of the firm. The
distinction that we draw concerns the mechanism by which takeover occurs, rather than
1
its format. This difference has important implications for the timing, terms, and efficiency
of takeover.
Our modeling approach has two key components. There are two types of acquirer who
can make takeover offers, distinguished by their comparative advantages in running the
target firm. The values that these firms place on the target are driven by a stochastic
industry variable, which may be thought of as industry demand, that varies randomly over
time. The first type, the ‘growth-acquirer’, has the higher valuation when the state is high
(e.g., because its synergies generate greater profit when demand is large). Conversely, the
second type, the ‘decline-acquirer’, has the higher valuation when the state is low (e.g.,
because its fixed costs savings yield greater returns than synergies when demand is low).
The second component of our modeling is that the takeover market is competitive: there
are two potential acquirers, who compete for the target either directly in a bidding war
(the first model), or indirectly via the bargaining process (the second model).
These two components lead to our main result: there is delay in equilibrium. Takeover
by the growth-acquirer occurs only when the state is sufficiently high, while takeover by
the decline-acquirer occurs only when the state is sufficiently low. This result is driven
by ‘real options’ inherent in the takeover decision, which stem from three key features of
the situation. First, although it may be delayed, takeover is irreversible: once the target
is acquired by one firm, it cannot be reallocated to the other (or the original owners).
Secondly, takeover decisions are made in an environment of uncertainty: valuations are
driven by a stochastic state variable (industry demand). Third, competition makes payoffs
convex : with bidding competition, each bidder’s payoff function is convex since if it loses
it receives a payoff of zero; in agreed takeover, the target can choose between two potential
acquirers, giving it a convex payoff function. On their own, irreversibility and uncertainty
are not sufficient to cause delay—we show that competition is also required for delay to
occur.
For both takeover models, we show that the extent of delay increases with the degree
of uncertainty. In agreed takeover, convexity of the target’s payoff function generates a
benefit to waiting for more extreme values of the state variable, and this benefit increases
with uncertainty. This is the usual real options effect. When takeover results from
bidding competition, convexity of the bidders’ payoff functions produces a similar effect,
but there is also a second factor which has the opposite implication. The likelihood of
being pre-empted, i.e., of the state variable changing by a large amount so that the rival
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firm acquires the target, also increases with uncertainty. In deciding when to make an
offer competing bidders balance these two factors; our result shows that the first effect
dominates so that delay increases with uncertainty.
Thirdly, we examine the efficiency of the market for corporate control in each case
by comparing the timing of takeover with the efficient solution. The efficient solution
does involve delay: the target should be taken over by one of the acquirers only when
that firm’s valuation is sufficiently greater than its rival’s. But neither form of takeover
generates the efficient degree of delay, and the direction of inefficiency differs between
the two cases. With competitive bidding delay is excessive, because competition creates
negative externalities between bidders, causing them to delay bidding too long. For agreed
takeover, by contrast, there is insufficient delay, because the bargaining process creates
a positive externality between the outside bidder’s valuation and the payoff of the target
firm, causing it to open negotiations too soon. As a corollary, the analysis implies that
takeover will be more delayed when bids are hostile than when they require the target’s
agreement.
We consider some further implications and extensions of the competitive bidding
model. Even when takeover results from competitive bidding, and hence the target lacks
direct control, it may be able to influence the timing of takeover through its exposure
to industry shocks (e.g., by its choice of investment projects). We show that the target
prefers competitive bidding to take place immediately—it suffers from the delay in com-
petitive bids—and so will choose the lowest possible exposure to uncertainty in order to
reduce delay. Finally, we consider extensions of the model to more than two bidders.
In summary, our results have the following implications for takeover activity and the
market for corporate control. First, they imply that even when there is competition
between acquirers, the target may not be taken over immediately. Secondly, takeover
activity will be highest during ‘booms’ and ‘busts’, i.e., when there extreme shocks to
an industry, with less activity in between—fitting the empirical pattern. Finally, the
market for corporate control is inefficient: takeover is too delayed when it occurs through
competitive bidding, and too rapid when it takes place by agreement.
The empirical literature on takeovers generally is large; see Weston, Chung and Hoag
(1990) for a review. The empirical studies of particular relevance for our analysis are four
papers which find a positive relationship between takeovers and industry shocks. Mitchell
and Mulherin (1996) find that takeover activity in the 1980s was greatest in those indus-
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tries exposed to the largest shocks. Using two measures of shocks—the absolute value of
the difference between a particular industry’s sales growth and the average sales growth
across all 51 industries in their sample, and the corresponding measure for employment—
the authors relate these absolute differences to a number of measures of takeover activity.
They find that shocks to sales growth and employment are positively and significantly
related to takeover attempts and actual takeovers. In contrast, industry sales growth
has no explanatory power for industry variation in takeover activity. Similarly, Andrade
and Stafford (2004) find a positive relationship between merger activity and the absolute
deviation of sales growth from its long-term mean within an industry. Harford (2005)
observes that absolute changes to a number of variables, including profitability, employee
growth and sales growth, are all abnormally high prior to increases in takeover activity.
Finally, focusing on the effect of demand shocks, Bernile, Lyandres and Zhdanov (2007)
also find a significant ‘U’-shaped relationship between mergers and shocks.
Among the theoretical literature, relatively few papers deal with the timing of takeovers.
A number of papers study the relationship between aggregate shocks and takeovers;
for example, Shleifer and Vishny (2003) consider the implications of stock market mis-
valuation for takeover activity. Fewer papers, however, consider the role of industry-level
shocks, and most of these can explain only one side of the ‘U’-shaped relationship be-
tween takeovers and industry shocks found in the empirical literature. In Morellec and
Zhdanov (2005), two firms compete to acquire a target. The authors determine when
takeover occurs in equilibrium and the terms of the takeover (i.e., the division of surplus
between acquirer and target). In their model, takeovers occur only in growing markets,
when the acquirer’s relative cash flows are sufficiently large, and competition between
bidders speeds up the takeover process. Our results are quite different: takeovers occur
in both growing and declining markets, and competition causes delay.
Lambrecht (2004) argues (like us) that merger synergies, resulting from economies of
scale, are an increasing function of product market demand. Combining this with fixed
merger costs and stochastic demand, merger has call option-like features. Consequently,
firms have an incentive to merge only in periods of economic expansion; hence, takeovers
are pro-cyclical. In contrast, Lambrecht and Myers (2007) analyze takeovers in declining
markets. In their model, the managers of a declining firm are reluctant to shut it down;
takeovers are permitted by shareholders as a means to solve this agency problem. The
authors characterize how the timing of takeover depends on the identity of the acquirer
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(for example, whether it is a management buy-out or a raider), and assess the efficiency
of the resulting timing of closure.
Bernile, Lyandres and Zhdanov (2007) seek, like us, to provide a theoretical explana-
tion of the ‘U’-shaped empirical relationship between takeovers and industry shocks (as
well as providing further empirical verification of it). In their theoretical model, incum-
bent firms have a static incentive to merge in order to increase their market power. But
by merging, the incumbents may create an added incentive for an outside firm to enter
their industry. The entry decision is unaffected by merger at extreme values of industry
profitability: at low levels, entry will not occur, and at high levels, entry will occur re-
gardless of the incumbents’ behavior. Hence, merger occurs at these extreme values. For
moderate levels of industry profitability, an entrant will enter only if there is insufficient
competition in the market, i.e., only if the incumbents have merged. Hence, at these
profitability levels, the incumbents choose not to merge in order to deter entry. Clearly,
this theory is quite different from ours, though the resulting pattern of takeover activity
is broadly similar.
The theoretical papers that we have discussed share with ours a common modeling
approach: firms face uncertainty and irreversibility when making their decisions, with
uncertainty modeled by a continuous time stochastic process. These papers therefore
build on, and contribute to, the growing number of papers analysing strategic interactions
in real options settings. See, for example, Smets (1991), Grenadier (1996), Hoppe (2000),
Weeds (2002), Lambrecht and Perraudin (2003), Novy-Marx (2007), and Mason and
Weeds (2009).
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we describe the model of takeover
with competitive bids and characterize equilibrium, focusing in particular on the timing of
takeover. In section 3, we derive the efficient timing of takeover, comparing this with the
outcome of competitive bidding. In section 4 we present the alternative model of agreed
takeover, solving for the timing of takeover and comparing with the efficient solution.
Section 6 outlines some further implications and extensions of the competitive bidding
model: the preferences of the target firm and implications for its project choice, and
extension of the model to more than two bidders. Section 7 concludes.
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2 The Timing of Takeover with Competitive Bids
In this section we model takeover as a competitive bidding process, its timing and terms
being determined by offers made by two potential acquirers in competition with one
another. The target firm is entirely passive, being acquired by the highest bidder at a
time of the acquirer’s choosing. The situation is effectively that of a hostile takeover;
such an approach to takeovers is common in the US and UK.1
2.1 The model
Two risk-neutral firms can each bid to acquire a target firm. When one firm decides to
make an offer a bidding war results, with the target sold to the highest bidder.2 The
decisions to bid and acquire can be delayed indefinitely, but once the target has been
acquired by one bidder no further actions are considered. Thus, takeover is irreversible,
limiting the analysis to one ‘cycle’ of acquisition.3 Time is continuous and the time
horizon is infinite with t ∈ [0,+∞). There is no sunk cost of making an offer (though
this could be added).
The potential acquirers are of different types, distinguished by their comparative ad-
vantages in running the target firm. The first type, the ‘growth-acquirer’, exploits syn-
ergies such as economies of scale to lower marginal costs and expand production. The
second type, the ‘decline-acquirer’, looks to consolidate and cut fixed costs of production,
for example by shedding capacity.4 The values that the two firms place on the target
are driven by a stochastic industry variable that varies randomly over time; this can be
thought of as the level of industry demand. The growth-acquirer has the higher valuation
when the state variable is high, e.g., because its economies of scale generate greater profit
when demand is large. Conversely, the decline-acquirer has the higher valuation when
the state variable is low, e.g., because fixed costs savings yield greater returns than scale
economies when demand is low.5
1A hostile bid is defined as one in which the target board’s initial reaction is to recommend target
shareholders to reject the offer. This accounts for 20–25% of takeovers in the UK and the US; see Schwert
(2000).
2This is a plausible assumption: there are often multiple suitors for specific targets, and this com-
petition reduces bidders’ returns. See Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988) and De, Fedenia and Triantis
(1996).
3One justification for this assumption is that post-merger integration prevents subsequent divestiture
or acquisition of the original business unit.
4See Andrade and Stafford (2004) for empirical work on this distinction.
5An alternative possibility arises when the bidders are located in different countries. In this case, the
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Formally, we normalize the value of the target under current ownership to zero. The
valuations of the potential acquirers are represented as si(θ) : R+ → R+, i ∈ {G,D},
where G denotes the growth-acquirer and D the decline-acquirer. The valuations are
functions of an exogenous stochastic variable θ ∈ R+ (industry demand) which evolves
according to a geometric Brownian motion (GBM) without drift:
dθt = σθtdWt (1)
where σ ∈ [0,+∞) is the instantaneous standard deviation or volatility parameter, and
dWt is the increment of a standard Wiener process {Wt}t≥0, so that dWt ∼ N(0, dt). The
continuous-time discount rate is r > 0. The parameters σ and r are common knowledge
and constant over time.
The following assumption is made about the acquirers’ valuations:
sG(θ) = λθ, λ > 0; sD(θ) = η, η > 0. (2)
The fact that the firms’ valuations are non-negative means that we focus on the case in
which it is efficient to sell the target; moreover, with two credible bidders at every value
of θ, bidding occurs competitively in equilibrium. A crucial feature for our analysis is
that the relative valuation δ(θ) ≡ sG(θ) − sD(θ) is upwards single-crossing in θ: firm
G’s valuation of the target is greater than firm D’s when θ is high—above the critical
threshold
θ∗ ≡ η/λ.
Conversely, firm D has the higher valuation when θ is low—below θ∗.
These linear functional forms are chosen for their analytical convenience. One informal
story to support them is that firm G can exploit synergies to lower the unit cost of
production of the target after acquisition. When industry demand is θ, firm G can
generate an extra profit of the form λθ, where λ is related to the cost saving. Meanwhile,
firm D is a consolidator who can reduce the fixed costs of the target by η.
The competitive bidding game has two stages. The first stage is a timing game in
which the potential acquirers decide when (i.e., at what level of the state variable) to bid.
state variable is the exchange rate between the countries. If firm 1 is in the same country as the target,
it has the higher valuation when the exchange rate is strong; when the exchange rate is weak, the foreign
firm 2 has the higher valuation. We are grateful to Pauli Murto for suggesting this example.
7
Once one or more of the firms decides to make an offer, the game then enters a second,
bidding stage in which the firms both submit bids (if they wish). In the timing game, we
assume that firms use stationary Markovian strategies; a formal definition of these and
of Markov perfect equilibrium is provided in Appendix A. In the bidding stage, firm i
acquires the target if and only if its bid bi exceeds that of its rival b−i and is greater than
zero. If it bids successfully, firm i receives the payoff si(θ) while paying its bid to acquire
the target. If firm i bids unsuccessfully (or not at all), it receives a payoff of zero. In the
event of a non-zero tie (bG = bD > 0), the target is allocated randomly between the firms.
Hence the inter-temporal payoff of firm i is
Vi(T, bG, bD; θt) =


Et
[
(si(θT )− bi(θT ))e
−r(T−t)
]
ifbi > max[0, b−i],
0 ifbi < max[0, b−i],
1
2
Et
[
(si(θT )− bi(θT ))e
−r(T−t)
]
ifbi = b−i > 0,
0 ifbi = b−i = 0,
(3)
where T ≡ min[TG, TD] and Ti is the (random) first time at which firm i makes a bid; the
operator Et denotes expectations conditional on information available at time t.
2.2 Takeover with a single acquirer
Suppose there is a single acquirer, of either type G or type D. In our model it is straight-
forward to determine when a single firm, not faced with a rival bidder, will make its offer.
Each firm’s valuation of the target si is linear in the state variable θ. Consequently, in
either case, there is no option value to the firm and hence no incentive to delay bidding.
(The firm would have an incentive to delay only if its valuation function were sufficiently
convex in θ.) As we shall see, this is in marked contrast to the competitive bidding sit-
uation: in the game between the two competing acquirers, equilibrium always involves
delay.
2.3 Competitive bidding equilibrium
We look for equilibria with the following two properties regarding behavior in, respectively,
the timing and bidding stages of the game.
• Property 1: Trigger Bids. The timing of bids is represented by a trigger thresh-
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old of the state variable θ for each player. Firm G bids at the first instant that θ
hits the interval (or ‘stopping region’)[θG,+∞), and firm D bids at the first instant
that θ hits the interval [0, θD] (values of the trigger points are to be determined).
• Property 2: Competitive Cautious Bidding. Firms’ bidding behavior has the
following features: (i) if one firm bids, then so does the other; (ii) the firms epsilon-
outbid each other; (iii) the losing firm bids cautiously, i.e., so as to be indifferent
between winning and not winning at the equilibrium bids. In terms of equilibrium
strategies, for i ∈ {G,D},
bi(θ) =

 b−i(θ) + ǫ ifb−i < si,si ifb−i ≥ si,
where ǫ > 0 is arbitrarily small (hereafter, ǫ is generally ignored).
We can now define the equilibrium concept that we shall use to derive the solution to
the competitive bidding game.
Definition 1 (Competitive, Cautious, Trigger equilibrium) Any equilibrium that
satisfies properties 1 and 2 is called a Competitive, Cautious, Trigger (CCT) equilibrium.
Trigger strategies seem the natural ones to consider given the single-crossing property
of the relative valuation function δ(θ). Restricting attention to competitive bidding means
that we can focus on the timing (rather than the level) of bids as our primary interest.
We concentrate on cautious equilibria to rule out arbitrary outcomes in which the losing
bidder effectively uses weakly dominated strategies.6 A CCT equilibrium is characterized,
therefore, by the two trigger points θG and θD. (In Appendix A we demonstrate formally
the existence of a CCT equilibrium.)
To determine the equilibrium trigger points, the game is solved backwards as follows.
In the bidding stage, competitive cautious bidding (property 2) ensures that each firm
bids at most its actual valuation of the target, si. Combined with the single-crossing
property of the relative valuation δ(θ), this implies that (were bidding to take place)
Goutbids D for θ > θ∗ but is outbid by its rival for θ < θ∗. A firm that is outbid receives
a payoff of zero; we can therefore conclude that each firm bids only in the interval where
it is not the losing bidder, i.e., that θG ≥ θ
∗ ≥ θD.
6The same equilibrium notion is used in the equilibrium analysis of Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (1996)
and Felli and Harris (1996).
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Accordingly, each firm’s value function has three components, holding over different
ranges of θ. For θ ≥ θG, firm G bids immediately, acquiring the target with a net payoff
of λθ − η (ignoring ǫ, which is arbitrarily small), while D receives a payoff of zero. For
θ ≤ θD, firm D bids immediately, acquiring the target with a net payoff of η − λθ, while
G receives a payoff of zero. In the continuation region before either firm has bid, i.e., for
θ ∈ (θD, θG), in any short time interval dt starting at time t firm i receives a flow payoff
of 0 and experiences a capital gain or loss dVi. The Bellman equation for the value of the
bidding opportunity to firm i is therefore
Vi = exp (−rdt)Et [Vi + dVi] .
Itoˆ’s lemma and the GBM equation (1) gives the ordinary differential equation (ODE)
1
2
σ2θ2V ′′i (θ)− rVi(θ) = 0.
The general solution of this homogeneous ODE is Vi = Aiθ
α + Biθ
α+1, where Ai and Bi
are constants determined by boundary conditions (discussed below), and α > 0 is the
positive root of the quadratic equation Q(z) = 1
2
σ2z(z + 1)− r:
α =
1
2
(
−1 +
√
1 +
8r
σ2
)
> 0. (4)
Putting the three parts together, firm G’s value function is
VG(θ) =


0 θ ≤ θD,
AGθ
−α +BGθ
α+1 θD < θ < θG,
λθ − η θ ≥ θG.
(5)
BGθ
α+1 is an option term anticipating G’s bid for the target; AGθ
−α is an option-like
term anticipating firm D’s bid. Similarly, D’s value function is
VD(θ) =


η − λθ θ ≤ θD,
ADθ
−α +BDθ
α+1 θD < θ < θG,
0 θ ≥ θG.
(6)
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Equilibrium is derived from a number of boundary conditions, which together de-
termine the two trigger points and four constants. By arbitrage, the trigger threshold
θG for firm G must satisfy a value-matching condition. Optimality requires a second,
smooth-pasting condition to be satisfied;7 this condition requires the components of firm
G’s value function to meet smoothly at θG. θD is not chosen optimally by firm G; hence
the smooth-pasting optimality condition does not apply here for firm G. Value functions
are forward-looking, however, and so a value-matching condition applies at θD. Hence
there are three boundary conditions for firm G—value-matching and smooth-pasting at
θG, and value-matching at θD:
AGθ
−α
G
+BGθ
α+1
G
= λθG − η,
−αAGθ
−α−1
G
+ (α + 1)BGθ
α
G = λ,
AGθ
−α
D
+BGθ
α+1
D
= 0.
These three equations can be combined to yield
(
θG
θD
)2α+1
=
(α + 1)θG − αθ
∗
−αθG + (α + 1)θ∗
. (7)
Equation (7) gives implicitly the best-response correspondence of firm G, which we denote
θG(θD).
A similar story holds for firm D. Value-matching and smooth-pasting hold at θD, and
value-matching alone at θG:
ADθ
−α
D
+BDθ
α+1
D
= η − λθD,
−αADθ
−α−1
D
+ (α + 1)BDθ
α
D
= −λ,
ADθ
−α
G
+BDθ
α+1
G
= 0.
These three equations can be combined to give
(
θG
θD
)2α+1
=
−αθD + (α + 1)θ
∗
(α + 1)θD − αθ∗
,
which gives implicitly the best-response correspondence of firm D, which we denote
θD(θG).
7See Dixit and Pindyck (1994) for an explanation.
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θG
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θ∗
θ∗
θˆG
θˆD
Figure 1: Reaction functions
Note that the firms’ best responses are well-defined and non-empty for all θG, θD ∈
(θ, θ¯), where
θ¯ ≡
(
α + 1
α
)
θ∗ > θ∗, θ ≡
(
α
α + 1
)
θ∗ < θ∗. (8)
A CCT equilibrium exists if there is a solution to the simultaneous equations (7) and (8)
with θ¯ > θG ≥ θ
∗ ≥ θD > θ. The following proposition establishes the existence of such
a solution.
Proposition 1 (CCT equilibrium) There exists a unique solution to equations (7)
and (8) with θ¯ > θG > θ
∗ > θD > θ.
Proof. See Appendix B. 
The CCT equilibrium is illustrated in figure 1. Note from the figure (see also the
proof of the proposition) that the reaction functions also intersect at θG = θD = θ
∗. The
following corollary, which follows immediately from the relative slopes of the reaction
functions around the point θG = θD = θ
∗, means that this solution can be ignored in the
remainder of the analysis.
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Corollary 1 The solution θG = θD = θ
∗ to equations (7) and (8) is not stable under the
best-response dynamic (when strategies are restricted to be CCT).
Proposition 1 and corollary 1 imply that takeovers occur only when shocks to the
industry variable θ are sufficiently large: when θ rises above θG or falls below θD . For
moderate shocks such that θ lies in the interval (θD, θG), the firms delay making offers.
Our model can, therefore, explain the empirical findings of Mitchell and Mulherin (1996)
and others, surveyed in the Introduction, that takeovers occur in industries experiencing
large negative and positive shocks.
Two features of our model are crucial for generating this result. The first is that
the firms’ valuations of the target are imperfectly correlated, with the relative valuation
function δ(θ) = λθ− η being upward-sloping in θ. We interpret this feature as capturing
two distinct types of bidder: one whose plans for the target are based on a growing market
(firm G), the other whose plans are based on a declining market (firm D). The second
feature is that the takeover market is competitive. As pointed out in section 2.2, with
a single acquirer there is no delay—the target is acquired immediately. When there is a
rival bidder, however, each firm’s payoff function becomes convex: it is bounded below
by 0 when the firm loses, and is equal to the difference in the firms’ valuations when
the firm wins. This convexity creates an incentive to delay bidding: rather than bidding
immediately, or at the first instant when it has the larger valuation, each firm waits until
the difference in valuations is sufficiently large. This feature—that competition makes
payoffs convex—is quite general; we therefore expect to see bidder delay in more general
environments than the one that we consider in this paper.
2.4 The effect of uncertainty
An important comparative static involves the effect of an increase in uncertainty (i.e., the
parameter σ) on the trigger points θG and θD. A standard property of single-firm real
option models is that when uncertainty increases, irreversible actions are more delayed
(i.e., occur at a higher level of the state variable for firm G, and at a lower level for firm
D). The reason for this is that delay allows for the possibility that the random process
(1) might change; if it goes in an adverse direction (down for firm G, up for firm D), then
the firm need not act. The greater the variance of the process, the more valuable is the
option created by this asymmetric situation, hence more delay occurs.
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The situation is complicated in the multiple firm case by the threat of pre-emption. If
firm G delays, then it may lose its option altogether should firm D act in the meantime.
This consideration can be seen in the value function in equation (5), for example. The
term BGθ
α+1 > 0 is firm G’s valuation of the option to delay due to the single-firm real
options effect; the option-like term AGθ
−α < 0 is the decrease in the valuation due to the
possibility that firm D, not firm G, acquires the target—i.e., the pre-emption effect.
There are, therefore, two factors pulling in opposite directions when uncertainty in-
creases; the comparative statics of θG and θD with respect to σ are determined by the
balance between these two factors. Proposition 2 shows the net effect of the two.
Proposition 2 (Uncertainty and competitive bidding equilibrium) ∂θG/∂σ > 0
and ∂θD/∂σ < 0 for all σ ≥ 0.
Proof. See Appendix B. 
The proposition shows that the standard option effect (which acts to increase θG and
lower θD as σ increases) outweighs the pre-emption effect (which acts in the opposite
direction). This need not always be the case: when the random process in equation (1)
has a strictly positive drift µ,8 there are cases when the pre-emption effect dominates. We
have shown analytically (in a proof available on request) that when µ > 0, in the limit
as σ → +∞, the comparative statics are reversed, i.e., ∂θG/∂σ < 0 and ∂θD/∂σ > 0 .
Numerical analysis suggests that this outcome occurs when the drift parameter is large
(close to, but below, the interest rate r) and there is a substantial degree of uncertainty.
When µ is large, the opportunity cost of holding the option to bid is small, and so the
option value is large. When σ is large, the option value is large. Hence both conditions (µ
and σ large) ensure that the firms’ options to bid are very valuable. But when σ is large,
each firm assesses a high probability that the state variable hits the other firm’s trigger
point. The optimal response of each firm to an increase in σ is then to decrease delay,
so that θG falls and θD rises, to limit the probability of pre-emption and so preserve its
large option value.9
In a sense, therefore, the result in proposition 2 is not entirely general, though it holds
in the model we have specified: the comparative static with respect to σ is unambiguous
8i.e., dθt = µθtdt+ σθtdWt where µ ∈ (0, r) is the drift parameter. The restriction µ < r ensures that
there is a positive opportunity cost to holding the option to bid to acquire the target. This means that
each firm bids at some finite value of the state variable, rather than holding the option in perpetuity.
9See Mason and Weeds (2009) for a more general analysis of when the standard real options compar-
ative static is reversed because of pre-emption.
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only when µ = 0. But the numerical analysis suggests that, even with a large drift, the
extent of delay increases with σ for almost all values of the volatility parameter.
Proposition 2 can be contrasted with the findings in Bernile, Lyandres and Zhdanov
(2007). Their model, like ours, has an upper and lower trigger such that merger occurs if
the state variable rises above (falls below) the upper (lower) trigger. They find, however,
that both of their triggers increase with the degree of uncertainty. Consequently, in
their model, the zone in which no takeover activity is observed may actually decrease
as uncertainty increases. In contrast, in our model, this zone increases with uncertainty.
This offers the prospect of distinguishing empirically between the two models.
3 Efficient Timing of Takeover
Efficiency requires that the target be acquired by the firm with the higher valuation. The
identity of that firm is stochastic: when θ < θ∗, it is firm D; when θ > θ∗, it is firm G. The
timing of acquisition must also be efficient. We denote the efficient trigger points by θL
for the lower threshold and θH for the upper one. The efficient allocation rule then takes
the form “award the target to firm D immediately if θ ∈ [0, θL], to firm G immediately if
θ ∈ [θH ,∞), otherwise wait”.
The social value function is as follows. Acquisition by firm i has a social value equal
to its full valuation si(θ); any payment for the target is merely a transfer and so is not
subtracted from the social value. Between the efficient trigger points, i.e., for θ ∈ (θL, θH),
there is a social option value which takes the familiar form. Putting these components
together, the social value function is
W (θ) =


η θ ≤ θL,
AEθ
−α +BEθ
α+1 θ ∈ (θL, θH),
λθ θ ≥ θH .
(9)
The efficient triggers θL and θH are determined optimally, thus value-matching and
smooth-pasting conditions apply at both points. These four equations yield, after elimi-
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nation of the option value coefficients AE and BE ,
θH =
(
α+ 1
α
) 1
2α+1
θ∗ > θ∗, (10)
θL =
(
α
α+ 1
) 1
2α+1
θ∗ < θ∗. (11)
(The symmetry of the equations implies that θH = θ
∗2/θL.)
Since pre-emption is not an issue in the efficient solution, the triggers θH and θL should
have the the usual property of delay for situations of irreversible action under uncertainty;
that is, θH should be increasing and θL decreasing in σ. The next proposition confirms
this conjecture.
Proposition 3 (Uncertainty and efficient triggers) 1.
(i) limσ→0 θH/θL = 1;
(ii) limσ→∞ θH/θL =∞;
(iii) ∂θH/∂σ > 0, ∂θL/∂σ < 0.
Proof. Equations (10) and (11) imply that
θH
θL
=
(
α + 1
α
) 2
2α+1
.
Parts (i) and (ii) of the proposition follow immediately from observing that as σ → 0,
α →∞, and as σ →∞, α → 0, respectively. Part (iii) of the proposition will be proved
for θH ; an equivalent argument holds for θL. Since α is a decreasing function of σ,
∂
∂σ
(
α + 1
α
)
> 0 and
∂
∂σ
(
1
2α+ 1
)
> 0.
This implies immediately that θH is increasing in σ. 
In the next proposition we compare directly the competitive bidding equilibrium and
efficient triggers.
Proposition 4 (Inefficiency of competitive bidding equilibrium) θG ≥ θH and θD ≤
θL.
16
Proof. See Appendix B. 
Proposition 4 tells us that there is too much delay in the competitive bidding equi-
librium. A comparison of payoffs reveals why this is so. The efficient payoff is πE ≡
max{λθ, η}; in the competitive bidding model the payoff of firm G is πG ≡ max{λθ−η, 0}
and that of firm D is πD ≡ max{η − λθ, 0}. Competitive payoffs are lower because the
acquirer must outbid its rival, paying the amount of latter’s valuation to the owner of
the target firm. Hence, competition creates negative externalities: πi = πE − s−i < πE for
i ∈ {G,D}. Notice that the competitive payoff of a firm is lower than the efficient payoff
both when it wins the target and when it loses. The reduction in payoff on winning leads
the firm to bid later (relative to the efficient trigger); the reduction in payoff on losing
leads to an earlier bid. When an firm chooses its trigger point optimally the former effect
dominates, so that negative externalities lead to more delay in equilibrium.
To understand why, consider first the choice of trigger point by firm G. Firm G’s
competitive payoff πG is lower than the efficient payoff πE by an amount η (the valuation
of firm D), both when it wins the target and when it loses to firm D. Note, however, that
firm G will be the first to bid only when θ ≥ θ∗, when it has the higher valuation. In
determining G’s trigger point, the payoff reduction on winning is more important than
the reduction on losing, because the former occurs immediately while the latter occurs in
the future (when θ falls below θ∗) and so is discounted. Although the undiscounted payoff
reductions are equal, the reduction on winning has greater weight. So, for a given lower
trigger point (θL, say), the upper trigger in competitive equilibrium is greater than the
efficient upper trigger. The shape of the reaction functions (established in proposition 1)
then ensures that θG ≥ θH ≥ θL ≥ θD.
This argument for firm G relied on firm D’s valuation of the target being a constant,
η. A more general intuitive argument can be made. Over the interval θ ∈ (θD, θG), firm
G’s value function (given in equation (5)) has two components. The first, OLG(θ) ≡
AGθ
−α < 0, is an option-like term anticipating firm D’s successful bid; the second
OG(θ) ≡ BGθ
α+1 > 0 is an option term relating to its own successful bid. At firm G’s
optimally-chosen trigger point θG, value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions imply
that OG(θG) > −OLG(θG) > 0 and O
′
G
(θG) > −OL
′
G
(θG) > 0 (where the prime denotes
the derivative with respect to θ). Hence the option term is of greater magnitude in terms
of both level and slope.10 In short, the value from winning is more important than the
10Equivalently for firm D: its value function in equation 6 has two components, the option term
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value from losing, hence firm G’s trigger point lies above the efficient level. This argu-
ment suggests that the result in proposition 4 should generalize beyond linear valuation
functions, although we have not shown this analytically.11
More generally, a second effect may also arise: the negative externalities may not only
shift equilibrium payoffs, but also change the degree of convexity, relative to the efficient
payoff. If the externalities create more (less) convexity, then they will tend to lead to
more (less) delay in equilibrium, other things equal. Firm G’s equilibrium payoff function
is (weakly) more convex than the efficient payoff function iff
s′′
G
(θ)
s′
G
(θ)
≥
s′′
D
(θ)
s′
D
(θ)
∀ θ,
assuming non-zero first derivatives. With linear valuation functions this condition is
satisfied with equality (since s′′
G
= s′′
D
= 0), hence this effect does not arise in our analysis.
4 The Timing of Agreed Takeover
In several (especially continental European and south-east Asian) countries, hostile takeovers
are a rarity:12 either the company is controlled by a majority shareholder, or incumbent
management can block unwanted bids through a variety of measures. Instead, then,
takeover can occur only by means of an agreement reached between the target and ac-
quirer. In this section we present an alternative model, of agreed takeover, in which the
target chooses when to open negotiations with one of the acquirers, and the terms of
takeover result from bargaining between the parties.
4.1 The model
In our setting with a single target and two potential acquirers, agreed takeover is modeled
as follows. The target firm chooses when to open negotiations with one of two possible
OD(θ) ≡ ADθ
−α > 0 relating to its own successful bid, and the option-like term OLD(θ) ≡ BDθ
α+1
anticipating firm G’s successful bid. Value-matching and smooth-pasting at firm D’s trigger point θD
imply that OD(θD) > −OLD(θD) > 0 and −O
′
D
(θD) > −OL
′
D
(θD) > 0. Again, the option term is of
greater magnitude in level and slope.
11Numerical investigation supports this optimism.
12Schneper and Guille´n (2004) report that between 1988 and 1998, 431 hostile takeovers attempts were
announced in the US and 220 in Britain, while only 20 were announced in France, 12 in Sweden, five in
Germany, three in Malaysia, two in Thailand, and just one each in Chile and Japan.
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acquirers, i ∈ {G,D} , though not with both simultaneously.13 If negotiations break down
without agreement, the chosen firm goes away forever; the target can then negotiate with
the other acquirer. Valuation functions of the two acquirers, sG (θ) and sD (θ), are as
described by (2), and the stochastic state variable θ (industry demand) evolves according
to equation (1). Entering into negotiations is costless (a negotiation cost could be added)
and can be delayed indefinitely, but once the target has been acquired no further actions
are considered. Time is continuous and the discount rate is r > 0.
The game has two stages. The first is a timing stage in which the target chooses
when (i.e., at what level of the state variable) to open negotiations with one of the
potential acquirers. The second stage is a bargaining game between the target and the
chosen acquirer; we assume that the surplus from merger is divided according to the
Nash bargaining solution.14 In bargaining with the first firm, the target has the outside
option of opening negotiations with the second; this possibility is also incorporated into
the analysis.
As before the game is solved backwards, starting with the bargaining stage. Suppose
that the target chooses to open negotiations with firm i. With risk-neutral players,
the Nash bargaining solution (NBS) is the division of surplus that solves the following
maximization problem
max
ti
(ti − dT ) (si − ti − di) ,
where ti is the target’s share of the surplus from takeover by i (i.e., of i’s valuation si),
and dT , di are the disagreement payoffs of the target and potential acquirer respectively.
If no agreement is reached, firm i walks away empty-handed; thus di = 0. The target,
by contrast, has the outside option of negotiating with the other firm −i; since both
acquirers’ valuations are strictly positive for all θ > 0, this is preferable to remaining
independent. In its negotiations with i, therefore, the target’s disagreement payoff is its
gain from subsequently negotiating with −i. Thus, to solve the bargaining problem, we
must first ascertain the value of the target’s outside option.
In its negotiations with the remaining acquirer, were these to take place, the target
has no (further) outside option; if bargaining failed, the payoffs of both target and firm
−i would be zero. Applying the NBS with dT = d−i = 0, the target’s gain from agreeing
13In effect, we assume that the target can commit to sell at the time of its choosing, and not at any
other time. An alternative assumption might be that both parties must agree to open negotiations;
bargaining would then take place at the first θ that is in the stopping regions of both parties.
14For details of Nash’s bargaining approach see Osborne and Rubinstein (1990), chapter 2.
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takeover with −i (after failing to reach agreement with i) is 1
2
s−i.
15 This amount forms
the target’s disagreement payoff in its negotiations with firm i. Applying the NBS to this
problem, the target’s payoff from agreeing takeover with i is
ti (θ) =
1
2
si (θ) +
1
4
s−i (θ) . (12)
To solve the timing stage, consider the target’s payoff from agreeing takeover with each
of the potential acquirers. From (12), the target prefers takeover by firm G (respectively,
D) for θ > (respectively, <) θ∗. The target’s payoff function from agreeing takeover with
its chosen acquirer is
t(θ) =


1
2
η + 1
4
λθ θ ≤ θ∗,
1
2
λθ + 1
4
η θ ≥ θ∗.
This function is increasing and convex in θ (with a kink at θ∗), implying that the target
has an option value of delaying negotiations. Its optimal strategy is represented by a pair
of trigger thresholds {θB, θU}, with θB < θ
∗ < θU , such that the target opens negotiations
with firm D for θ ≤ θB and with firm G for θ ≥ θU .
The target’s value function is given by
VT =


1
2
η + 1
4
λθ θ ≤ θB,
AT θ
−α +BT θ
α+1 θB < θ < θU ,
1
2
λθ + 1
4
η θ ≥ θU .
(13)
The trigger points θB and θU are determined by the following value-matching and smooth-
pasting conditions
AT θ
−α
B
+BT θ
α+1
B
=
1
2
η +
1
4
λθB,
−αAT θ
−α−1
B
+ (α + 1)BT θ
α
B
=
1
4
λ,
AT θ
−α
U
+BT θ
α+1
U
=
1
2
λθU +
1
4
η,
−αAT θ
−α−1
U
+ (α + 1)BT θ
α
U
=
1
2
λ.
15Note that, given the functional forms assumed for sG and sD, the target’s payoff from takeover by
−i is linear in θ. Hence it gains no option value by delaying agreement with the remaining bidder: this
second round of bargaining would therefore take place immediately.
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These equations can be combined to give
(
θU
θB
)α
=
αθB + 2 (α + 1) θ
∗
2αθU + (α+ 1) θ∗
, (14)(
θU
θB
)α
=
2 (α + 1) θU + αθ
∗
(α + 1) θU + 2αθ∗
θU
θB
. (15)
We are looking for a solution to the simultaneous equations (14) and (15) with θU >
θ∗ > θB. The next proposition demonstrates existence and uniqueness of such a solution.
Proposition 5 (Agreed takeover triggers) There exists a unique solution to equa-
tions (14) and (15) with θU > θ
∗ > θB.
Proof. See Appendix B. 
4.2 The effect of uncertainty
Again, an important comparative static involves the effect of an increase in uncertainty
(i.e., the parameter σ) on the trigger points θU and θB . With the timing of negotiations
chosen by the target, pre-emption is not an issue for agreed takeover. Thus, the triggers
should have the the usual property of delay for situations of irreversible action under
uncertainty; i.e., θU should be increasing and θB decreasing in σ. Proposition 6 confirms
this conjecture.
Proposition 6 (Uncertainty and agreed takeover) ∂θU/∂σ > 0 and ∂θB/∂σ < 0
for all σ ≥ 0.
Proof. See Appendix B. 
4.3 Comparison with the efficient solution
The trigger points for agreed takeover can be compared with the efficient triggers θH and
θL. The next proposition ranks these trigger points.
Proposition 7 (Inefficiency of agreed takeover) θU < θH and θB > θL.
Proof. See Appendix B. 
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Proposition 7 tells us that agreed takeover takes place too soon, compared with the
efficient solution. A comparison of payoffs in the two cases reveals why this is so. The
efficient payoff is πE ≡ max{λθ, η}; with agreed takeover the target’s payoff is πT =
max{1
2
λθ + 1
4
η, 1
2
η + 1
4
λθ}. If, instead, the target’s payoff were max{1
2
λθ, 1
2
η} (which
would be the case in the absence of the outside option), it would be a simple rescaling of
the efficient payoff (1
2
πE), resulting in the identical trigger points {θH , θL}. Relative to
this, the target’s payoff when it agrees takeover with bidder i is increased by one-quarter
of the valuation of the outside bidder −i: i.e., πi
T
= 1
2
πE +
1
4
s−i for i ∈ {G,D}. Hence
the target’s payoff is less convex, implying less delay.
This feature arises from the target’s outside option in the bargaining game with the
acquirer, which allows it to gain an additional share of the takeover surplus related to
the valuation of the outside bidder. In effect, the bargaining process creates a positive
externality between the valuation of the outside bidder −i and the target’s payoff from
agreeing takeover with i, which reduces delay.
As a corollary of proposition 7, we can also rank the triggers for agreed takeover
against those for the competitive bidding model. Taken together with proposition 4, the
findings imply that θU < θG and θB > θD: agreed takeovers occur with less delay than
competitive bids.
5 Summary of Results
Summarizing, our analytical results are as follows.
1. Competitive bidding: θG is greater than θ
∗ and increasing in σ; θD is less than θ
∗
and decreasing in σ (propositions 1 and 2);
2. Efficient solution: θH is greater than θ
∗ and increasing in σ; θL is less than θ
∗ and
decreasing in σ (equations (10) and (11), and proposition 3);
3. Agreed takeover: θU is greater than θ
∗ and increasing in σ; θB is less than θ
∗ and
decreasing in σ (propositions 5 and 6);
4. Ranking of trigger points: θG ≥ θH > θU and θD ≤ θL < θB (propositions 4 and 7).
These results are illustrated by the numerical analysis shown in figure 2, which plots
the various trigger points against different values of σ. In this numerical analysis, we set
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θD
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θL
θU
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θ∗
Figure 2: Triggers against degree of uncertainty σ
the interest rate r to 5%, firm D’s value η to 10 and the slope of firm G’s value λ to 1.
With these values, θ∗ = 10.
6 Extensions
6.1 Target preferences and project choice
In section 2, the timing of takeover is determined by competing bidders, with the target
as a passive player. Nonetheless, in this setting it is possible that the target may be able
to influence the timing of takeover through its exposure to industry shocks, say by its
choice of investment projects. Here we assess the target firm’s preferences regarding the
timing of takeover in the competitive bidding model. Then, assuming that the target can
influence the volatility parameter σ through its choice of projects, we briefly consider the
target’s incentives regarding project choice.
When acquisition occurs, the owner of the target firm receives the valuation of the
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losing bidder. Its payoff is therefore
u(θ) =


λθ θ ≤ θD,
η θ ≥ θG.
For θ ∈ (θD, θG) the target’s value function consists of two option-like terms anticipating
takeover by one or other of the acquirers; thus, the target’s value function is
U(θ) =


λθ θ ≤ θD,
AUθ
−α +BUθ
α+1 θD < θ < θG,
η θ ≥ θG.
(16)
The coefficients AU and BU are determined by value-matching conditions at the bidders’
trigger points θG and θD; there are no corresponding smooth-pasting conditions as the
triggers involve no optimality on the part of the target.
Observe that the target’s payoff function u(θ) is concave. Thus greater delay, i.e., a
widening of the trigger points θG and θD, is harmful to the target. If the target firm’s
owner were able to determine the timing of acquisition, it would choose to sell immediately.
Note that this finding does not require a functional form assumption such linearity of
the valuation functions. It depends only on the assumption that the difference in the
valuations is (weakly) increasing in θ, and that bidding is competitive so that the target
receives the lower of the two bidders’ valuations.
The target cannot directly control the timing of takeover—bid timing is determined
by the acquirers—but it may be able to influence this indirectly through the volatility
parameter σ. Following e.g., Sung (1995), Cadenillas, Cvitanic´ and Zapatero (2004, 2007)
and De´camps, Mariotti and Villeneuve (2006), we assume that the target can influence
the volatility parameter σ through its choice of which project(s) to pursue. We now
consider briefly the target’s incentives regarding project choice.
Note that in our model, there is an alternative interpretation of volatility. The stochas-
tic process θ drives the gap between the valuations of the target firm and acquirer G, with
this difference being scaled by λ. Thus, the volatility σ may be interpreted as the degree
of correlation between the value of these assets when controlled by the target and under
the alternative ownership of firm G, where a higher value of σ represents a reduction in
the correlation between these valuations. The degree of correlation between the valua-
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tions of the target and acquirer D, with a fixed cost reduction, is unaffected. However,
since D must outbid G to win the target, the payoff functions of both bidders (net of bid
payment) depend on θ and the correlations of both are affected by the target’s choice of
σ.
Numerical analysis suggests that an increase in σ reduces the target’s pre-bid value
(the middle segment of the target’s value function in equation (16)). This is illustrated
in figure 3, in which σ increases from 0.2 to 0.4. From proposition 2, we know that
the acquiring firms’ triggers widen when the degree of uncertainty σ increases. Hence in
the figure, θD shifts to the left and θG to the right. The result is a downward shift in
the target’s value function. Hence in this numerical example, the target prefers the lower
value of σ. While we have not been able to establish this analytically, numerical examples
suggests that the result holds more generally.
Figure 3: The target’s value function against σ
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6.2 More than two bidders
Finally, we consider how the modeling and results in section 2 might be affected if there
were more than two bidders for the target firm.
We have fixed exogenously the number of bidders to equal two.16 Whatever the
number of bidders, the critical assumption for our analysis is that the bidders’ valuations
can be ordered with respect to a single state variable. With just two bidders, this means
that the relative valuations of the bidders must be single-crossing. There is then a single
value of the state variable so that the identity of the highest valuation bidder is determined
by whether the state variable is above or below that level. With more than two bidders,
the same basic assumption is required: that the set of values of a single state variable
can be sectioned into disjoint and contiguous intervals. A particular bidder then has the
highest valuation only if the level of the state variable is within a particular interval.
Subject to this assumption, a number of possibilities arise. Suppose first that there
are two broad types of bidders: growth-acquirers (G-bidders) and decline-acquirers (D-
bidders). For simplicity, suppose that there is a single D-bidder, whose valuation of the
target is η > 0. But there are two G-bidders: one with a valuation of the target of λ1θ
(we label this bidder as the G1-bidder), the other (the G2-bidder) with a valuation λ2θ,
where 0 < λ2 < λ1. The G2-bidder never acquires the target in equilibrium, but it acts
as a constraint on the G1-bidder when the latter sets its bid. When θ ≥ θ
∗
1 ≡ η/λ1,
the G1-bidder has the highest valuation. Within this interval, the identity of the second
highest valuation bidder depends on θ∗2 ≡ η/λ2 > θ
∗
1. For θ ∈ [θ
∗
1, θ
∗
2), the second highest
valuation bidder is the D-bidder, and so the G1 -bidder must pay η in order to acquire
the target. When θ > θ∗2, the G2-bidder has the second highest valuation and the G1-
16The empirical evidence (which is not extensive) provides some support for this feature. In De,
Fedenia and Triantis (1996), out of 660 contests over the period 1962–1988, 460 involve just one bidder,
and 200 involve more than one bidder. The authors do not report how many bidders are involved in
contests in which there are multiple bidders, but in those 200 contests, only 279 bidders were involved.
This indicates that, where there are multiple bidders, there are relatively few bidders; and that some
bidders are involved in more than one contest. A similar story emerges from Boone and Mulherin
(2002), who study a sample of 50 US firms acquired by private auction over the period 1989–1998. The
mean (respectively, median) number of firms initially contacted by the target was 63.2 (respectively, 50).
Of the firms initially contacted, an average of 28.7 firms (median of 18) indicated interest by signing
confidentiality agreements. An average of 6.3 firms submitted preliminary proposals. An average of 2.6
potential bidders (median of 2) submitted binding written offers. The authors contrast these statistics
with the number of competing public bids for the firms in the auction sample. On average, there
were 1.3 competing public bids; the median was 1. Of course, little can be said about the presence of
potential bidders, who do not submit bids but affect the bidding behavior of firms that do actually bid.
Nevertheless, these findings provide informal support for our modeling decision to limit the number of
bidders to two.
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bidder must pay λ2θ > η to acquire the target. In consequence, the payoff function of the
G1-bidder were it to bid at θ becomes
G1(θ) =


0 θ ≤ θ∗1,
λ1θ − η θ ∈ (θ
∗
1, θ
∗
2)
(λ1 − λ2) θ θ ≥ θ
∗
2.
Compared with the two-bidder case, there is a kink at θ∗2 : after this point the payoff
function flattens, with a slope of (λ1 − λ2) rather than λ1.
If λ2 is low, such that G1’s unconstrained trigger (in the absence of the G2-bidder)
θG < θ
∗
2, then the presence of the G2-bidder has no effect on the equilibrium and efficient
solutions. But for higher values of λ2 such that the unconstrained θG > θ
∗
2, the equilibrium
behavior of the G1-bidder is constrained by the G2-bidder. Note that the G1-bidder’s
payoff function is concave over the interval (θ∗1,∞) ; with θD unchanged, the G1-bidder
would therefore bid at the kink θ∗2 itself. The optimal behavior of the D-bidder will also
change: since triggers are strategic complements, θD will be higher. In other words, the
increase in competition among G-bidders reduces the extent of equilibrium delay, but
does not eliminate it. Hence our main result is robust to this type of extension, as long
as there are asymmetries between bidders of each type.
The picture is more complicated when there are more than two possible winning
bidders. To illustrate the issues, suppose that there are three possible winning bidders,
labeled D, M, and G. The D-bidder has a valuation of the target of η, the M-bidder has
a target valuation of η + λθ, and the G-bidder values the target at λθ, where 0 < η < η
and 0 < λ < λ. (The M-bidder can be viewed as having a combined strategy: some asset
stripping and some exploitation of synergies.) The bidders’ valuations as functions of θ are
shown in figure 4. With these valuation functions there are three critical values of the state
variable: θ∗ ≡
(
η − η
)
/λ; θ∗ ≡ η/λ (the critical threshold in the two-bidder case), and
θ¯∗ ≡ η/
(
λ− λ
)
, where θ∗ < θ∗ < θ¯∗. Standard arguments suggest that the D-bidder bids
in the interval [0, θD], where θD < θ
∗; the G-bidder bids in the interval [θG,+∞), where
θG > θ¯
∗; and the M-bidder bids in the interval [θM , θ¯M ], where θ
∗ < θM < θ¯M < θ¯
∗. The
bidding intervals are illustrated in figure 4, in bold along the horizontal axis. In this case,
therefore, takeovers occur at moderate values of the state variable as well as at extreme
(large or small) values. Nevertheless, the general feature remains: given an initial value
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Figure 4: Valuations with 3 bidders
of the state at which no takeover occurs, a sufficiently large positive or negative shock to
the state can lead to a takeover occurring.
Does a third bidder reduce the size of the shock that is required to induce takeover?
There are two conflicting effects. Takeover—by the M-bidder—now occurs for interme-
diate values of θ between θMand θ¯M ; with just the D-bidder and G-bidder, no takeover
occurs for intermediate θ. But the presence of the M-bidder also changes the equilib-
rium behavior of the G- and D-bidders, as each now competes directly with the M-bidder
rather than with one another. Suppose that the initial value of θ lies in the interval(
θ∗, θ¯∗
)
, so that bidding competition occurs between the G- and M-bidders. Assuming an
interior solution for θ¯M ,
17 the bidders’ value functions resemble those in the two-bidder
case, with value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions at the bidder’s own trigger and
value-matching alone at its rival’s. Considering the G-bidder (a corresponding analysis
holds for the M-bidder relative to the D-bidder in the two-bidder case), its payoff func-
tion is altered: in the two-bidder case the G-bidder’s payoff was max
(
0, λθ − η
)
; when
competing against the M-bidder this becomes max
(
0,
(
λ− λ
)
θ − η
)
. If it were the case
that η/λ = η/
(
λ− λ
)
(and thus θ∗ = θ¯∗), this would represent a simple rescaling of
payoffs and G’s trigger point would be unchanged. But with θ¯∗ > θ∗, the increasing
segment of G’s payoff is shifted upwards relative to this, raising G.18 A corresponding
analysis of bidding competition between the D- and M-bidders over the lower interval of
17Otherwise, the M-bidder will act at θ∗, where its payoff has a concave kink.
18A corresponding analysis holds for the M-bidder’s payoff compared with that of the D-bidder in the
two-bidder model, implying that θ¯M exceeds θD in the two-bidder case.
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θ implies that θD is shifted downwards compared with the two-bidder case. Thus, with
three bidders, the takeover triggers of the G- and D-bidders are widened (i.e., θG rises
and θD falls). Taken together, this analysis implies that takeover continues to be delayed
in equilibrium, while the size of the shock required to induce takeover may increase or
decrease.19
In summary: allowing for additional bidders does not change the general feature that
a sufficiently large positive or negative shock to the state variable is needed to stimulate
takeover, although the precise pattern of takeover activity is likely to be affected.
7 Conclusions
We have developed a theoretical framework modeling the timing of takeovers, in order
to explain the empirical finding that takeovers occur after both positive and negative
shocks to industry-specific conditions. Our approach relies on two key assumptions: that
there are two types of acquirers distinguished by their comparative advantages in running
the acquired firm, and that the takeover market is competitive. We model both hostile
takeover, where the timing and terms are determined by the competing bidders, and
agreed takeover, where the target chooses when to open negotiations with one of the
potential acquirers. In both cases, we show that in equilibrium takeover occurs only
when there is a sufficiently large shock to industry conditions. We show that this delay,
and hence the market for corporate control, is not efficient. Moreover, the direction of
inefficiency depends on the form of takeover: hostile bidding occurs too late, and agreed
takeover too early, compared with the efficient solution. We also show that the extent
of the delay increases in the degree of uncertainty about industry conditions; this result
(which is not found in Bernile, Lyandres and Zhdanov (2007)) suggests an empirical test
of our model.
We have briefly examined the incentives and behavior of the target firm when faced
with competitive bidding. In future work this line might be further developed, looking
at the range of target actions that might influence the timing of (hostile) takeover. For
agreed takeover, the impact of different selling mechanisms might be assessed. Finally,
the separation of ownership and control implies that managerial, rather than shareholder,
19Numerical analysis suggests that the gap between θG and θ¯M exceeds that between the triggers in
the two-bidder case, thus if the initial value of θ is in this range, there might be more rather than less
delay.
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incentives determine the behavior of the target; in this context an analysis of managers’
payoffs becomes relevant.
Appendix A
Formalization of the timing game
To formalize the timing game described in section 2.1, we define two further state variables
x and y. At any time t ≥ 0, let x = 0 if firm G has not made a bid for the target at
any time τ ≤ t and x = 1 otherwise; let y ∈ {0, 1} indicate the same for firm D. The
current state of the game is the triple (θ, x, y). At any time t > 0, past realizations of the
process described by equation 1 and past bid decisions constitute the history of the game.
The firms are assumed to use stationary Markovian strategies: actions depend on only
the current state and the strategy formulation itself does not vary with time.20 A (pure)
Markovian strategy for firm i ∈ {G,D} (at time t) has two parts: (i) when xt = yt = 0,
a measurable function21 mi(θt) : R+ → {0, 1} which takes the value 0 when the firm has
not made a bid, and the value 1 when the firm makes a bid; (ii) when xt + yt > 0, a
measurable function bi(θt) : R+ → R describing the bid submitted by the firm.
Markov perfect equilibrium is defined as follows.
Definition 2 (Markov Perfect Equilibrium, MPE)
A pair of strategies (m∗
G
, b∗
G
), (m∗
D
, b∗
D
), with T ∗ ≡ min[T ∗
G
, T ∗
D
] and T ∗i ≡ inf{t|m
∗
i (θt) =
1}, is a Markov Perfect Equilibrium if and only if, for all θt and i ∈ {G,D},
Vi(T
∗, b∗
i
, b∗−i; θt) ≥ Vi(T, b
∗
i
, b∗−i; θt), ∀mi(θt),
Vi(T
∗, b∗i , b
∗
−i; θt) ≥ Vi(T
∗, bi, b
∗
−i; θt), ∀bi
where T ≡ min[Ti, T
∗
−i], Ti ≡ inf{t|mi(θt) = 1}.
Note that deviation strategies are not required to be Markovian.
20For further explanation, see Maskin and Tirole (1988) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1991). Non-
Markovian equilibria may exist. Since we want to analyze how the resolution of uncertainty affects the
takeover game, we concentrate on equilibria in Markovian strategies. This allows us to rule out collusive
equilibria with continuation strategies that depend on information that is not payoff-relevant.
21Measurability is with respect to the filtration F of the complete probability space (Ω,F , P ) on which
the Wiener process {Wt}t≥0 in equation (1) is defined.
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Existence of a CCT equilibrium
To show that a CCT equilibrium exists, consider first the bidding stage when at least one
of the firms has made a bid. By the standard ‘Bertrand’ argument in common knowledge
bidding games, when one firm bids competitively and cautiously, then the best response
is a competitive, cautious bid. Given this behavior in the bidding stage, now consider
the prior stage when the firms must decide when to bid; and suppose that firm D bids at
the first time that the state variable hits the interval [0, θD]. Firm G’s value function V0
when it is not bidding is
V0 =


0 θ ≤ θD,
AGθ
−α +BGθ
α+1 θ > θD.
Its value function when it makes a bid is given by
V1 =

 λθ − η − ǫ if sG(θ) > sD(θ)0 otherwise.
By a standard argument (see Dixit and Pindyck (1994)), the continuation region (i.e., in
which no bid is made) for firm G is the half-open interval [0, θˆ), while the stopping region
(in which a bid is made) is the interval [θˆ,∞), for some θˆ.
An analogous argument holds for firm D’s best response when firm G uses a CCT
strategy. In summary: the best response to a CCT strategy is itself a CCT strategy.
Hence
Proposition 8 A CCT equilibrium exists, and is given by the solutions to equations (7)
and (8).
Of course, non-CCT equilibria exist—there are Markovian equilibria that are non-
CCT (for example, the continuum of equilibria with non-cautious bidding in the bidding
stage of the game); and there are non-Markovian equilibria. Our focus on Markovian
CCT equilibrium is motivated by our interest in the timing of non-collusive bids.
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Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1 (CCT equilibrium) There exists a unique solution to equations (7) and
(8) with θ¯ > θG > θ
∗ > θD > θ.
Proof. The symmetry of equations (7) and (8) implies that
θG =
θ∗2
θD
.
Let w ≡ θG/θ
∗. Equation (7) then implies that
w4α+2 =
(α + 1)w − α
−αw + α+ 1
. (17)
This equation defines a polynomial in w. We are interested in roots of this polynomial
that satisfy w ≥ 1. The first root is clearly w = 1. There must be (at least) a second
root, since the left-hand side of equation (17) is greater than zero and finite for w ∈
[α/(α + 1), (α + 1)/α], while the right-hand side is zero at w = α/(α + 1) and tends to
infinity as w → (α + 1)/α.
We now show that there is no more than 1 root such that w > 1. The slope of the
left-hand side of equation (17) is (4α+2)w4α+1; at an intersection point, this must equal
(
4α + 2
w
)
(α + 1)w − α
−αw + α + 1
.
The slope of the right-hand side is
2α+ 1
(−αw + α+ 1)2
.
At w = 1, the slope of the left-hand side is clearly greater than the slope of the right-hand
side. Hence at the ‘next’ intersection point (i.e., the intersection point with the lowest
w > 1), it must be that the slope of the right-hand side is greater than the slope of the
left-hand side. I.e., at this intersection point,
2α + 1
(−αw + α + 1)2
>
(
4α+ 2
w
)
(α + 1)w − α
−αw + α + 1
.
32
Rearranging this inequality gives
−α(α + 1)(4α+ 2)w2 + ((α + 1)2(4α+ 2) + α2 − 2α− 1)w − α(α + 1) < 0.
The left-hand side of this expression is a quadratic in w. Given the signs of the coefficients
in the quadratic, if the inequality is satisfy for an w∗ > 1, it must be satisfied for all
w ≥ w∗. Hence at any intersection point w > 1, it must be that the slope of the right-
hand side of equation (17) is greater than the slope of the left-hand side. There can be,
therefore, only one intersection point w > 1. 
Proof of Proposition 2
Proposition 2 (Uncertainty and competitive bidding equilibrium) ∂θG/∂σ > 0
and ∂θD/∂σ < 0 for all σ ≥ 0.
Proof. The proof of both parts of the proposition concentrates on the reaction function
of firm G, equation (7); the symmetry in equations (7) and (8) means that the equivalent
result for firm D follows immediately. Equation (7) can be rewritten as
θG
(Θ(θG))
1
2α+1
= θD
whereΘ(θG) ≡
(α + 1)θG − αθ
∗
−αθG + (α + 1)θ∗
.
Consider the denominator of the left-hand side of this reaction function. Taking logs and
differentiating with respect to σ gives
∂
∂σ
ln
(
(Θ(θ))
1
2α+1
)
=
2ασ
(2α+ 1)2
(
− lnΘ(θ) +
1
2
(
Θ2(θ)− 1
Θ(θ)
))
where ασ ≡ ∂α/∂σ. Since ασ < 0, the sign of this expression is determined by the sign of
− lnΘ(θ) +
1
2
(
Θ2(θ)− 1
Θ(θ)
)
. (18)
Consider the function φ(x) ≡ − ln x + 1
2
(
x−1
x
)
(1 + x). φ(1) = 0; and for x > 1, the
first derivative is
φ′(x) =
1
2
(
x− 1
x
)2
> 0.
33
Hence φ(x) > 0 for x > 1. The expression in equation (18) is therefore positive for all
values of σ. So the denominator of the left-hand side of the reaction function of firm G is
decreasing in σ; and consequently, the reaction function of firm G shifts upwards when σ
increases. With the symmetric argument for firm D’s reaction function, the proposition
follows. 
Proof of Proposition 4
Proposition 4 (Inefficiency of competitive equilibrium) θG ≥ θH and θD ≤ θL.
Proof. The proof works by showing (through contradiction) that θG/θD ≥ θH/θL; since
θG = (θ
∗)2 /θD and θH = (θ
∗)2 /θL, this gives the result immediately. To simplify expres-
sions, let θ˜k ≡ θk/θ
∗ for k ∈ {G,D,H, L}. From equations (10) and (11),
θ˜H
θ˜L
=
(
α + 1
α
) 2
2α+1
;
from equation (7),
θ˜G
θ˜D
=
(
(α+ 1)θ˜G − α
−αθ˜G + α+ 1
) 1
2α+1
.
Suppose that θ˜H/θ˜L ≥ θ˜G/θ˜D. Manipulation of the above expressions shows that this
would mean that
θ˜G ≤
α3 + (α + 1)3
α(α + 1)(2α+ 1)
.
Similarly, from equation (8),
θ˜G
θ˜D
=
(
−αθ˜D + α + 1
(α + 1)θ˜D − α
) 1
2α+1
.
θ˜H/θ˜L ≥ θ˜G/θ˜D then implies that
θ˜D ≥
α(α+ 1)(2α+ 1)
α3 + (α+ 1)3
.
Hence θ˜H/θ˜L ≥ θ˜G/θ˜D implies that θ˜G/θ˜D ≤ 1—a contradiction (since θG ≥ θD). There-
fore θ˜H/θ˜L ≤ θ˜G/θ˜D. The proposition follows. 
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Proof of Proposition 5
Proposition 5 (Agreed takeover triggers) There exists a unique solution to equations
(14) and (15) with θU > θ
∗ > θB.
Proof. Equations (14) and (15) together imply that
θU =
θ∗2
θB
. (19)
Let y ≡ θU/θ
∗. Substituting into equation (14) yields
y2α+1 =
2(α + 1)y + α
2αy + (α + 1)
. (20)
This equation defines a polynomial in y. We are interested in roots of this polynomial
that satisfy y ≥ 1, demonstrating the existence of a solution θU ≥ θ
∗.
First we show that there must be (at least) one root y ≥ 1. At y = 1, the left-hand
side of this expression is unity while the right-hand side equals 3α+2
3α+1
> 1, thus y = 1 is
not a root. As y →∞, the left-hand side of (20) approaches infinity while the right-hand
side remains finite, tending towards α+1)
α
. Hence there must be at least one root y > 1.
Next we demonstrate that there is no more than one root such that y > 1. Both sides
of equation (20) are strictly increasing in y; the left-hand side is strictly convex while the
right-hand side is strictly concave. Thus the two cross only once; i.e., there exists a single
root y > 1.
Let z ≡ θ∗/θB. Substituting this and (19), equation (15) becomes
z2α+1 =
2(α + 1)z + α
2αz + (α+ 1)
. (21)
This equation takes the same form as (20). Thus, an identical proof demonstrates the
existence of a unique root z ≥ 1, i.e., of a solution θB < θ
∗. 
Proof of Proposition 6
Proposition 6 (Uncertainty and agreed takeover) ∂θU/∂σ > 0 and ∂θB/∂σ < 0 for
all σ ≥ 0.
Proof. The proof proceeds with reference to the proof of proposition 5. We start with
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the first part of the proposition, ∂θU/∂σ > 0. We have defined y ≡ θU/θ
∗. Since θ∗ is
strictly positive and independent of σ, ∂y/∂σ has the same sign as ∂θU/∂σ. The root α,
defined in (4), is strictly decreasing in σ, thus ∂y/∂σ and ∂y/∂α take opposite signs. So,
the proposition can be proven by demonstrating ∂y/∂α < 0.
Equation (20) defines a polynomial in y. Taking logs and differentiating with respect
to α, then rearranging, yields
(2y − 1) (2y + 1)
(2 (α+ 1) y + α) (2αy + α + 1)
+ 2 ln(y) = −
(
∂y
∂α
)
α (α + 1) (2α + 1) (2y + 1)2
y (2 (α + 1) y + α) (2αy + α + 1)
Since θU > θ
∗, y > 1 and ln(y) > 0. Thus the equation is satisfied only if ∂y/∂α < 0.
The second part of the proposition, ∂θB/∂σ < 0 , follows from an identical proof
based on equation (21) the corresponding polynomial in z ≡ θ∗/θB, demonstrating that
∂z/∂α < 0. This implies that ∂θB/∂α > 0, i.e., ∂θB/∂σ < 0. 
Proof of Proposition 7
Proposition 7 (Inefficiency of agreed takeover) θU < θH and θB > θL.
Proof. Equation (20) defines a polynomial in y ≡ θU/θ
∗. The proof of proposition 5
demonstrates the existence of a single root y > 1, i.e., that there exists a unique solution
θU > θ
∗. We now wish to compare θU with the efficient trigger θH . The left-hand side
of (20) is strictly increasing and convex in y, and approaches infinity as y → ∞. The
right-hand side of (20) is strictly increasing and concave in y; as y →∞ it remains finite,
tending towards α+1
α
. Thus we can write
y2α+1 =
2 (α+ 1) y + α
2αy + (α+ 1)
<
α + 1
α
.
Thus
y <
(
α + 1
α
) 1
2α+1
.
Substituting for y and rearranging, we can infer that
θU <
(
α + 1
α
) 1
2α+1
θ∗ = θH .
Equation (21), the equivalent polynomial in z ≡ θ∗/θB, generates a corresponding
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proof for θB, yielding
θB >
(
α
α + 1
) 1
2α+1
θ∗ = θL.

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